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“A magistrate judge may be assigned such additional duties as are not 
inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.”  
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). 
“[W]e must give content to the additional duties clause by looking to 
Congress’ intention that magistrates be delegated administrative and 
other quasi-judicial tasks in order to free Article III judges to conduct 
trials, most particularly felony trials.”  Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 
923, 948 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 
In Peretz v. United States,1 a bare majority of the Supreme Court 
held that the “additional duties” clause of the Federal Magistrates Act 
permits a magistrate judge2—with a defendant’s consent—to preside 
over voir dire3 at a felony trial.  The majority also did not perceive any 
constitutional danger arising from the exercise of the “judicial Power of 
the United States” by an Article I officer.4  At first glance, the result 
appears to be a common-sense victory for efficiency, and the vast 
majority of citations to Peretz do not involve reflection upon proper 
statutory interpretation, structural analysis, or the significance of certain 
judicial functions.  Rather, Peretz has been cited ad nauseum for the 
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 1.   501 U.S. 923 (1991). 
 2.   The shorter title “magistrate” was used from enactment of the Federal Magistrates Act of 
1968 until December 1990.  Except for direct quotations, this article uses the title “magistrate judge” 
throughout. 
 3.   Throughout this article, references to “voir dire” should be understood to include both 
questioning of the venire and actual juror selection (i.e., use of peremptory and cause challenges).  It 
does not necessarily extend to formal empaneling of the jury (i.e., the formality of swearing-in the 
selected jurors); the concern is the substantive questioning and selection of the potential jurors. 
 4.   U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
150 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
general propositions that “[t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants 
are . . . subject to waiver,” and, “the role of the magistrate in today’s 
federal judicial system is nothing less than indispensable.”5 
Closer examination of Peretz and its context reveals important 
underlying issues.  This article does not suggest that Article I magistrate 
judges are any less thoughtful than their life-tenured Article III 
colleagues.  Rather, the focus is on the statutory, constitutional, and 
practical distinctions between Article I and Article III judges.  As a 
constitutional matter, magistrate judges are not members of the federal 
judiciary,6 however “indispensable” they may have become.  And to 
allow them to conduct all duties of district judges threatens (eventually) 
to make life-tenured judges entirely dispensable, given the difficulty of 
filling judicial vacancies7 and the empirical data that magistrate judges 
are performing more and more work every year.8  The last quarter-
century has seen an increase in federal court filings but no corresponding 
increase in Article III judgeships.9  The Peretz majority invited a slow 
but inexorable shift to Article I officers as the solution by failing to 
(1) adhere to the limits placed on magistrate judge jurisdiction by 
Congress, (2) appreciate the danger of allowing the judiciary to delegate 
away its core power, or (3) recognize the inherent significance of felony 
voir dire.10  In so doing, the majority’s rationale departed from other 
Supreme Court decisions both before and since.11 
                                                            
 5.   Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936 (collecting cases); id. at 928 (Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 
305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)).  See also, e.g., Kelly Holt, Comment, Congressional Guidance on the 
Scope of Magistrate Judges’ Duties, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 909, 909 (2017) (opening with the statement 
that “[m]agistrate judges are ‘nothing less than indispensable’ to the modern judicial system,” before 
examining the current circuit split regarding magistrate judge jurisdiction over felony guilty pleas).  
 6.   Empirical research of federal civil matters demonstrates that magistrate judges have 
different propensities toward certain outcomes than district judges.  See Christina Boyd, The 
Comparative Outputs of Magistrate Judges, 16 NEV. L.J. 949, 981–82 (2016).  
 7.   See Judicial Vacancies, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-vacancies [https://perma.cc/Y6RF-UEVA] (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). 
 8.   Douglas Lee & Thomas Davis, “Nothing Less Than Indispensable”: The Expansion of 
Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utilization in the Past Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L.J. 845, 
935–36 (2016).   
 9.  The Judicial Conference of the United States consistently requests legislation to create new 
Article III judgeships, as the last comprehensive judgeship legislation was passed in 1990.  See, e.g., 
Judicial Conference Asks Congress to Create New Judgeships, UNITED STATES COURTS (March 14, 
2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2017/03/14/judicial-conference-asks-congress-create-new-
judgeships [https://perma.cc/P6B3-PNNP]. 
 10.   See generally, Daniel Hinde, Consensual Sentencing in Magistrate Court, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
1161, 1171–73 (1997) (explaining that Peretz “approve[d] magistrate judge duties and judicial 
processes developed by the courts themselves,” beyond the delegation from Congress). 
 11.   This article is not concerned with the conclusion that a defendant’s individual right to an 
Article III adjudicator is waivable, for that result is consistent with many other decisions.  See, e.g., 
Commodities Future Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851–57 (1986).   
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For example, the Peretz majority did not repudiate the persuasive 
statutory analysis from Gomez v. United States just two years earlier, 
which concluded that Congress did not intend felony voir dire to be an 
“additional duty” for magistrate judges.12  Rather, it fashioned a consent 
requirement for certain significant additional duties—such as felony voir 
dire—when conducted by magistrate judges, to be grafted onto both 
statutory analysis and constitutional analysis.  This result runs contrary to 
Congress’s express intention that delegation of some matters to 
magistrate judges would allow time for district judges to perform felony 
adjudications—which is evident, even for pure textualists, in the explicit 
provisions for magistrate judges to conduct civil trials13 and 
misdemeanor trials14 with litigant consent, with no mention of similar 
authority for felony trials.  Further, this approach is inconsistent with the 
subsequent majority opinion in Nguyen v. United States, which held that 
an Article IV judge could not sit by designation on a court of appeals 
panel where Congress has not empowered him to do so (even with 
litigant consent).  “Congress’s decision to preserve the Article III 
character of the courts of appeals is more than a trivial concern . . . and is 
entitled to respect.”15 
As this article explains more fully, the Peretz majority also departed 
from other Article III structural cases, especially by focusing so heavily 
on litigant consent16 and conflating civil matters with felony criminal 
matters.17  By making litigant consent dispositive in Peretz (as the only 
factor distinguishing Gomez), the Supreme Court invited dangerous dicta 
in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, where another narrow 
majority suggested that litigant consent can cure even Article III 
structural violations.18  Still, the holding in Sharif does not portend the 
end of Article III adjudicators, for bankruptcy judges address only civil 
matters.  Thus, the state-law claims at issue in Sharif might have been 
                                                            
 12.   See 501 U.S. at 932–33; Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989).  
 13.   28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2012). 
 14.   18 U.S.C. § 3401 (2012). 
 15.   539 U.S. 69, 79–80 (2003) (citation omitted).  
 16.   Compare Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936, with Schor, 478 U.S. at 851–57.  
 17.   Compare Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936, with Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 
1932, 1945 (2015) (“[B]ankruptcy courts possess no free-floating authority to decide claims 
traditionally heard by Article III courts.”). 
 18.   See Sharif, 135 S. Ct. at 1943 (“But allowing Article I adjudicators to decide claims 
submitted to them by consent does not offend the separation of powers so long as Article III courts 
retain supervisory authority over the process.”); Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Despite our 
precedent directing that ‘parties cannot by consent cure’ an Article III violation implicating the 
structural separation of powers . . . , the majority authorizes litigants to do just that.”) (citation 
omitted).   
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heard (in the alternative) by an elected state judge with substantially 
fewer protections of independence than even a bankruptcy judge, let 
alone a life-tenured district judge.19  The holding in Peretz does represent 
that danger, because it addresses federal felony proceedings, where the 
most significant elements could only be adjudicated in federal court and 
should be reserved for Article III judges.20  The concern is not the 
fairness of any one particular trial,21 but the need to draw certain lines in 
all trials to protect some inviolable role for life-tenured, Senate-
confirmed district judges. 
One might inquire: If Peretz is so inconsistent with other Supreme 
Court opinions, and the danger to judicial independence so clear, why 
does it deserve re-examination?  The main concern is continued reliance 
on Peretz as a resource for both statutory and constitutional questions 
regarding magistrate judges’ powers.  In the wake of the bankruptcy 
decisions Stern v. Marshall and Sharif,22 several commentators have 
explored whether magistrate judges have the power to preside over 
certain significant felony proceedings, such as guilty plea colloquies and 
collateral attacks, and none have fully recognized the extent to which the 
flaws in Peretz demand careful consideration of other relevant 
precedent.23  Federal courts themselves are also a concern, as multiple 
circuit courts of appeals have relied upon Peretz to broaden magistrate 
judges’ authority ever further, extending the contours of the Federal 
Magistrates Act and Article III itself.24  Instead, proper analysis of 
magistrate judges’ authority must consider the many cases running 
contrary to the almost-purely pragmatic analysis of Peretz that elevates 
                                                            
 19.   See F. Andrew Hessick, Consent to Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 VAND. 
L. REV. 715, 741–45 (2018). 
 20.   How can a litigant’s consent imbue a federal tribunal with authority it otherwise lacks?  
See Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 73–74 (2003).  And how voluntary can the judiciary’s 
delegation of its tasks be, and a defendant’s acquiescence to that delegation, when faced with certain 
and substantial delay in the alternative?  See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 948 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 21.   See generally Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017).  
 22.   Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011); Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932. 
 23.   See, e.g., Grant Ford, Note, Bringing United States v. Harden to Its Conclusion: The 
Seventh Circuit’s Reluctance to Act on the Flawed Decision’s Consequences, 61 ST. LOUIS L.J. 323 
(2017); Steven Maguire, Too Much of a Stretch: Why Acceptance of Felony Guilty Pleas by Federal 
Magistrates Defies the Intent of Congress and Erodes the Rights of the Accused Regardless of 
Consent, 9 DREXEL L. REV. ONLINE 31 (2017); Holt, supra note 5; Andrew Chesley, Note, The 
Scope of United States Magistrate Judge Authority After Stern v. Marshall, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 757 
(2016); Tomi Mendel, Note, Efficiency Run Amok: Challenging the Authority of Magistrate Judges 
to Hear and Accept Felony Guilty Pleas, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1795 (2015). 
 24.   See, e.g., United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2008).  But see United States v. 
Harden, 758 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Brown, 748 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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litigant consent above all other concerns.25 
Three paths could counter the danger of Peretz.  First, district courts 
should decline the invitation to alienate power over felony voir dire—
which is unreviewable as a practical matter26—and use local rules to 
retain exclusive jurisdiction over that duty at the threshold of felony trial 
itself.  Second, courts and commentators should be careful to place 
Peretz in the proper context (i.e., should recognize its inconsistencies 
with decisions such as Wingo v. Wedding, United States v. Raddatz, 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., Schor, 
Gomez, Nguyen, and Stern)27 to avoid, through a narrow focus on one 
case, removing statutory and constitutional constraints on magistrate 
judges’ authority.  Third, to reinforce the first and second solutions when 
the opportunity arises, the Supreme Court should overrule Peretz.28  This 
would preserve the entire scope of felony trial for Article III judges alone 
without upsetting Article III jurisprudence generally (for example, the 
line drawn in bankruptcy cases in Stern and Sharif). 
This article explores the history of Federal Magistrates Act 
jurisprudence to show that the Peretz majority was, in many ways, an 
aberration from the outset, as reflected in the cogent dissents of Justices 
Thurgood Marshall and Antonin Scalia.  It proceeds to consider 
subsequent decisions and to establish that even the flexible, multifactor 
structural analysis that prevails today should not allow anyone except a 
life-tenured Article III judge to preside at voir dire.  Finally, it examines 
the dangers as courts and commentators continue to embrace Peretz 
without considering its context and consequences. 
                                                            
 25.   For a comprehensive analysis of the dangers of jurisdiction conferred by consent, see 
generally Hessick, supra note 19. 
 26.   See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 951 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gomez v. 
United States, 490 U.S. 858, 874 (1989). 
 27.   One must note that Justice Stevens authored three critical cases on these issues: Gomez, 
Peretz, and Nguyen (in that order).  This puzzle does not permit easy resolution, as Peretz is simply 
inconsistent with the prior decision (Gomez) and subsequent decision (Nguyen).  At the very least, 
one must thoroughly address all three opinions to understand that litigant consent and efficiency 
concerns cannot override the limits placed by Congress and the constitution.  To read Peretz alone is 
to miss critical competing concerns articulated in Gomez, Nguyen, and other opinions. 
 28.   Congress could clarify that Gomez rather than Peretz provides the correct reading of the 
Additional Duties Clause and could provide additional Article III judgeships, but this notion is 
almost fanciful.  The judiciary itself has invited the consequences of Peretz, and, unless and until the 
legal community embraces a solution, Peretz encourages erosion of powers that ought to be reserved 
to district judges.  See generally Kimberly Anne Huffman, Peretz v. United States: Magistrates 
Perform Felony Voir Dire, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1334, 1361 (1992).  
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I. THE ROAD TO PERETZ V. UNITED STATES 
In Peretz, the Supreme Court faced the intersection of several 
questions regarding felony voir dire—its importance in the overall felony 
trial process, its eligibility as an “additional duty” under § 636, and the 
extent of district judge supervision required by Article III.  To properly 
examine Peretz, it is necessary to consider the framework that federal 
courts developed to resolve similar questions prior to the decision.  That 
framework reveals weaknesses in Peretz that should have been evident at 
the time it was decided, and that remain even a quarter-century later. 
A. The Significance of Voir Dire 
In practice, voir dire is not just important—it is vital.  For adherents 
to the view that voir dire is truly a preliminary matter of no particular 
significance, the outcome in Peretz might appear straightforward, and 
this article trivial.29  This conclusion assumes that voir dire is no more 
than a preliminary matter on the fringe of a felony trial and overlooks the 
importance many judges, attorneys, and commentators accord to the 
identity of jurors.30 
To minimize voir dire is to ignore the reality that jurors’ identities 
impact final verdicts.31  While jurors and litigants may have a common 
interest in fairly-balanced venires generally, those interests diverge in 
any individual case as the litigants seek a favorable outcome by all 
available means.32  The presiding judge must balance these competing 
interests, and each act—from ruling on a request to strike for cause to 
merely setting the time for juror questioning—might affect the outcome 
of the case.  By the time the presentation of arguments and evidence 
commences, the presiding judge has already played a critical role in 
                                                            
 29.   Even before Peretz was decided, the en banc Fifth Circuit offered a retort to this point of 
view: “With respect, we see voir dire in a different light – of greater importance.  The trial lawyer 
knows that who decides the truth from the evidence may be as important as the evidence.”  United 
States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1437 (5th Cir. 1987).   
 30.   See id. at 1438.  By express authority, magistrate judges may preside over civil trials, 28 
U.S.C. § 636, and misdemeanor trials, 18 U.S.C. § 3401, but only with consent.  Unless and until 
Peretz is extended further, as this article opposes, felony trial proceedings (with the unfortunate 
exception of felony voir dire) are reserved for district judges. 
 31.   See, e.g., Edward Adams & Christian Lane, Constructing a Jury That Is Both Impartial 
and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 704–08 
(1998) (discussing significance of racial diversity among jurors); see also Fred Hagans & William 
Hagans, Jury Selection in Personal Injury Cases, 77 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 44, 44 (2016) (recounting 
example where three different focus groups found 10% liability, 30% liability, and 100% liability). 
 32.   See Jury Selection and Composition, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1443, 1449–50 (1997). 
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ensuring the integrity of the jury. 
The importance of voir dire has long been recognized.  As early as 
1880, the Supreme Court explained “the constitution of juries is a very 
essential part of the protection that [trial by jury] is intended to secure.”33  
Just over a decade later, the Court established that a felony trial starts 
from the time “the work of [e]mpaneling the jury” begins (i.e., the 
beginning of voir dire).34  The questioning and selection of jurors is the 
threshold that leads to the “attachment of jeopardy.”35  Finally, as Batson 
v. Kentucky instructs, voir dire presents an unusual context where each 
participant—whether a defendant or a prospective juror—has a 
constitutional right to be protected from “the arbitrary exercise of power 
by prosecutor or judge.”36  In short, the Supreme Court has recognized 
voir dire as part of trial for over a century, and, just five years before 
Peretz was decided, the Supreme Court championed the importance of 
voir dire for both defendants and jurors themselves.  Any analysis 
regarding a presiding judicial officer’s authority should reflect this 
context. 
The Supreme Court recognized both the practical and legal 
significance of voir dire in its decisions regarding racial and gender bias 
from peremptory challenges.37  Voir dire provides the “means of 
discovering actual or implied bias” for the intelligent use of peremptory 
challenges, and the presiding officer must facilitate the process while 
identifying potential impermissible bias.38  By the time of J.E.B., Justice 
O’Connor freely acknowledged that “constitutionalizing” voir dire and 
jury selection had moved the process from “a sideshow” to “part of the 
main event” (i.e., part of trial).39  The Batson majority also addressed the 
argument that constitutional scrutiny of peremptory challenges would 
create undue burden on trial courts, noting that state courts prohibiting 
race-based peremptory challenges had “not experienced serious 
                                                            
 33.   Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880).  Strauder was a groundbreaking 
Equal Protection Clause case, and it proved to be an essential foundation for twentieth-century 
Supreme Court decisions regarding racial discrimination in the criminal process.  See Michael J. 
Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 65 (2000). 
 34.   Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892). 
 35.   See, e.g., Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975); see also Ford, 824 F.2d at 
1437 (“That double jeopardy does not attach until a jury is sworn does not suggest that the selection 
of the petit jury is preliminary.”). 
 36.   Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86–87 (1986).   
 37.   Id. (prohibiting race-based peremptory challenges); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 
U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (prohibiting gender-based peremptory challenges). 
 38.   J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143–44. 
 39.   See id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Lewis, 146 U.S. at 374. 
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administrative burdens.”40  Given that the Supreme Court does not view 
judicial supervision of voir dire as a serious administrative burden, it is 
difficult to understand why district courts need the power to assign that 
role to magistrate judges.41 
Any effort to preserve the exclusive role of Article III judges at 
felony trial should extend to felony voir dire.  Indeed, equating felony 
voir dire with civil and misdemeanor trials—as the Peretz majority did—
threatens to erase the distinction between felony trials and other 
adjudications entirely. 
B. Determining the Scope of Magistrate Judges’ “Additional Duties” 
The Magistrates Act of 1968 replaced United States Commissioners 
with expanded roles for new United States Magistrates in an effort to 
ease caseload burdens for federal district judges.42  From the beginning, 
federal magistrates (since 1990, “magistrate judges”) could perform 
“such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and 
the laws of the United States.”43  The explicitly-listed duties included 
“preliminary review of applications for post-trial relief made by 
individuals convicted of criminal offenses, and submission of a report 
and recommendations to facilitate the decision of the district judge 
having jurisdiction over the case as to whether there should be a 
hearing.”44  In Wingo v. Wedding, the Supreme Court considered whether 
a magistrate judge could conduct the habeas hearing itself (on a petition 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 regarding a state conviction45), over the 
petitioner’s objection and subject to de novo review of the recording by a 
district judge.46 
The Wingo majority, authored by Justice Brennan, looked to both the 
text and legislative history of the Additional Duties Clause in 
                                                            
 40.   Batson, 476 U.S. at 99. 
 41.   Any attempt to distinguish felony voir dire from felony trial also results in a puzzling 
distinction in light of the Fifth Amendment.  Each defendant may be placed in jeopardy only once, 
and that right attaches upon empaneling of the jury, which is a hollow formality after voir dire has 
been conducted.  See Lewis, 146 U.S. at 374; Serfass, 420 U.S. at 388; U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 42.   Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 462–63 (1974). 
 43.   Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5089, 5117 
(1990). 
 44.   Id.; see also Wingo, 418 U.S. at 471 (explaining the duties listed in the Judicial 
Improvement Act). 
 45.   Whether a federal magistrate judge may preside over a hearing on a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
petition—and potentially invalidate a decision by a federal district judge—remains an open question.  
See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1047 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 46.   418 U.S. at 465–66. 
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§ 636(b)(3).47  The majority examined other portions of the statute that 
explicitly allowed magistrate judges to preside over hearings or trials and 
contrasted the limiting language regarding hearings on petitions for 
habeas corpus, reasoning that the absence of similar language for post-
trial hearings was an implicit prohibition.48  The legislative history 
further clarified that the addition of the limiting language in § 636(b)(3) 
had been included in response to an objection from the Judicial 
Conference of the United States to the idea of magistrates conducting 
post-trial evidentiary hearings.49  Thus, it was error for a magistrate to 
preside over a habeas hearing, and the majority concluded that de novo 
review by the district judge could not cure the error because even the 
availability of a recording of oral testimony was not “the equivalent of 
the judge’s own exercise of the function of the trier of the facts.”50  The 
majority squarely rejected the notion that the Additional Duties Clause 
should be read broadly to the limits of Article III, despite Chief Justice 
Burger’s position in his Wingo dissent.51 
In short, Wingo offered a limited paradigm for assigning “additional 
duties” to federal magistrate judges by reference to their listed duties.  
Congress did not challenge this restrained approach to the Additional 
Duties Clause.  Instead, two years after the Wingo decision, Congress 
amended the Magistrates Act “in order to clarify and further define the 
additional duties which may be assigned to a United States Magistrate in 
the discretion of a judge of the district court.”52  The updated version of 
§ 636(b) no longer limited magistrate judges, as it had previously, to 
providing “assistance to a district judge in the conduct of pretrial or 
discovery proceedings in civil or criminal actions.”53  Instead, the 
updated § 636(b) explicitly allowed magistrate judges to “conduct 
evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed 
findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition,” subject to “de 
novo determination” by a district judge, as part of magistrate judges’ 
                                                            
 47.   Id. at 469–70. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.   Id. at 470–71.  There is no reason to suppose that the Judicial Conference’s objection to 
broad language in the Additional Duties Clause was limited to habeas proceedings. 
 50.   Id. at 474 (quoting Holliday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 352 (1941)). 
 51.   Id. at 475–81 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  In reaching this conclusion, Chief Justice 
Burger’s dissent attributed very little significance to the duties actually enumerated in § 636(b)(3) 
because they were, in his view, “illustrative, not exclusive.”  Id. at 481. 
 52.   United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 (1980) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-625, at 1 
(1976); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, at 2 (1976)). 
 53.   28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1968). 
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enumerated powers.54  Congress continued to empower magistrate judges 
to “hear and determine any pretrial matter,” with the exception of 
enumerated dispositive motions, such as motions to suppress evidence, 
subject only to review for clear error or legal error.55 
In United States v. Raddatz, the Court confronted the question of 
whether, over a defendant’s objection, a magistrate judge could conduct 
a suppression hearing and make dispositive credibility findings subject to 
de novo review of the cold record by a district judge.56  In contrast to 
Wingo, the Raddatz majority’s inquiry was simple and straightforward 
because Congress’s intent to allow magistrate judges to conduct pre-trial 
hearings subject only to district judge review of transcripts was 
“unmistakable.”57  The Raddatz majority also considered constitutional 
questions, evaluating the due process issue under the balancing test of 
Mathews v. Eldridge58 and concluding “that the due process rights 
claimed here are adequately protected by § 636(b)(1).”59  The majority 
distinguished “the interests underlying a voluntariness [suppression] 
hearing” from the “criminal law objective of determining guilt or 
innocence.”60  Finally, the majority held that de novo determination by a 
district judge avoided any “delegation” to a non-Article III judge and 
obviated the structural issue entirely,61 a conclusion at odds with the 
rationale of Wingo.62 
Raddatz provoked four separate concurrences and dissents.63  For 
                                                            
 54.   28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1976). 
 55.   28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1976). 
 56.   447 U.S. at 671–72. 
 57.   Id. at 676.  The Court contrasted the statutory language requiring “de novo determination” 
with the potential alternative “de novo hearing” that Congress might have used if it intended a 
district judge to rehear evidence.  Further, the legislative history explicitly indicated that Congress 
did not intend a district judge to conduct a new hearing.   
 58.   424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 59.   United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 680 (1980). 
 60.   Id. at 677–78.  Peretz, in contrast, evaluated a matter related to trial, where guilt is 
determined. 
 61.   Id. at 681–82. 
 62.   See Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974). But see Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 
270–71 (1976). 
 63.   Justice Blackmun concurred because he found the due process issue to be even simpler 
than the majority: Because § 636 simply adds a layer of procedural protection with “another neutral 
decisionmaker,” it could never violate Due Process.  447 U.S. at 684–85 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
Justice Powell agreed with the majority’s interpretation of § 636(b)(1), but he wrote separately 
because he felt that due process required a de novo hearing where a motion to suppress turned 
entirely on credibility.  447 U.S. at 686–87 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).  Justice Stewart 
dissented based on the plain language of § 636(b)(1) and the “accepted meaning of de novo 
determination” (i.e., “an independent determination of a controversy that accords no deference to 
any prior resolution”) which was uncontroverted, in his view, by the legislative history of the 1976 
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purposes of understanding the issues presented in Peretz, Justice 
Marshall’s Raddatz dissent warrants particular attention.  Justice 
Marshall focused on the constitutional requirements of the Due Process 
Clause and Article III, arguing that the majority’s approach of dividing a 
criminal trial itself from all other proceedings for purposes of due 
process undervalued a defendant’s interest (and the public interest) in 
having other constitutional rights protected by suppression.64  He also 
opined that Article III prohibited the delegation of any factual findings in 
a criminal case to an Article I officer,65 relying on decisions limiting 
military tribunals’ jurisdiction over civilians, such as United States ex rel 
Toth v. Quarles.66  Finally, Justice Marshall agreed with the other 
dissenters that a “de novo determination” of credibility was not possible 
on a cold record, though Justice Marshall viewed the cursory (even 
illusory) review by a district judge as an Article III problem rather than a 
Due Process Clause problem subject to Mathews v. Eldridge balancing.67 
In sum, the decisions in Wingo and Raddatz reflected recurring 
tensions that have continued to plague decisions regarding the authority 
of magistrate judges.  The Wingo decision took a narrow view of the 
“additional duties” clause with a careful reading in light of specifically-
listed duties, consistent with the text and legislative history of the 
Magistrates Act.  Wingo also indicated that a delegation by Article III 
judges to Article I officers was potentially problematic even if, in theory, 
Article III judges might review the delegated decision.  Although 
Raddatz recognized some value in de novo review by district judges, 
both Wingo and Raddatz made clear that Article III concerns lurked in 
the background and could serve to limit the role of Article I officers.  
Additionally, both the Wingo and Raddatz majorities recognized that 
proceedings determining criminal guilt or innocence constituted a 
distinct and significant stage different in kind from those regularly 
assigned to Article I officers. 
C. Article III Concerns and Article I Officers at Trials 
Two further legal developments set the stage for the federal courts to 
consider the use of magistrate judges at trials.  First, through the Federal 
Magistrate Act of 1979, Congress authorized a magistrate judge to 
                                                            
amendments.  447 U.S. at 691–92 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 64.   Id. at 700. 
 65.   Id. at 706. 
 66.   350 U.S. 11 (1955). 
 67.   Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 710–11. 
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conduct civil trials and enter judgment “upon consent of the parties,” 
with an appeal taken directly from that judgment to the relevant federal 
court of appeals;68 to conduct misdemeanor trials with consent;69 and to 
preside over criminal post-trial matters, such as petitions for habeas 
corpus.70  Second, the Supreme Court began using consent (previously a 
factor only in statutory analysis) as a factor in constitutional Article III 
analysis.71  The latter development arose as the Court explored the 
legislative court doctrine and Article III structural limitations. 
1. The Legislative Court Doctrine 
The question of litigant consent as a part of Article III analysis arose 
in the bankruptcy context through the divided decision Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.72  Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. brought state-law contract and tort claims as part of its 
reorganization in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota.73  
Marathon Pipe Line Co. objected on the basis of Article III.74 
The four-justice Supreme Court plurality by Justice Brennan 
concluded that Article I bankruptcy judges, who lack salary protection 
and are appointed to fourteen-year terms, could not decide state-law 
claims consistent with Article III.75  Bankruptcy courts were not typical 
“legislative courts,” such as territorial courts, courts-martial, and 
administrative courts for “public rights,” because the delegation of state-
law claims to Article I adjudicators could not be accomplished under any 
“exceptional grant of power” to Congress.76  The plurality recognized 
that allowing Article I officers to decide all matters that might relate to a 
bankruptcy proceeding, in the interest of expediency, would wash away 
any Article III limitation and any requirement for a district judge.77  
Finally, the plurality could not characterize bankruptcy judges as mere 
“adjuncts” of the district courts because the bankruptcy courts had all the 
                                                            
 68.   Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96–82, 93 Stat. 643 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2012)). 
 69.   Id. 
 70.   Id. 
 71.   See generally Hessick, supra 19 (focusing on Schor and Sharif in examining the 
weaknesses of consent as a basis for Article I adjudication). 
 72.   458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 73.   Id. at 56–57. 
 74.   Id. 
 75.   Id. at 76. 
 76.   Id. at 64–69. 
 77.   Id. at 73–74. 
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“essential attributes” of Article III judicial power, including the power to 
preside over jury trials.78 
A separate concurrence, authored by then-Justice Rehnquist and 
joined by Justice O’Connor, arguably controls in Northern Pipeline.79  In 
Justice Rehnquist’s view, “so much of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as 
enables a Bankruptcy Court to entertain and decide Northern’s lawsuit 
over Marathon’s objection to be violative of Art. III.”80  Justice 
Rehnquist relied on consent but as a means to narrow the holding, for 
consent was not a central factor animating in the constitutional analysis. 
81  Only Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Northern Pipeline82 understood 
consent to be among the important factors in Article III analysis, and 
some subsequent appellate decisions followed suit by incorporating 
consent into factor-balancing structural analysis.83 
The Supreme Court further explored “legislative courts” just four years 
later in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.84  The Court 
                                                            
 78.   Id. at 84–85. 
 79.   The relative precedential value of the Northern Pipeline opinions has always been 
somewhat uncertain.  The Supreme Court majority in Stern, for example, drew heavily on the 
Northern Pipeline plurality without qualifying the decision based on Justice Rehnquist’s 
concurrence.  See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 485–94 (2011).  Meanwhile, the majority in 
Sharif referred to the Northern Pipeline plurality, concurrence, and a dissent.  See Wellness Int’l 
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1946–47 (2015).  
 80.   Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 81.   Id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).  Justice Rehnquist expressed a desire to narrow the 
holding as much as possible to avoid contributing to the “arcane distinctions and confusing 
precedents” around Article III. 
 82.   Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  Justice White also dissented, joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Powell, arguing for a simple balancing analysis weighing judicial independence 
against the need for the non-Article III forum.  Id. at 106–12 (White, J., dissenting).  Justice White’s 
test emphasized the ability of district courts to review the record and, in so doing, created a blueprint 
for approving alienation of Article III power with limited Article III review.  Id. at 100 (White, J., 
dissenting).  Justice White recognized the inevitable end of his position: “There is no difference in 
principle between the work that Congress may assign to an Art. I court and that which the 
Constitution assigns to Art. III courts.”  Id. at 113 (White, J., dissenting).  His position has never 
gathered a substantial following on the Court, and even the opinions favorable to delegation in 
bankruptcy cases have acknowledged that Article III constrains Congress’s ability to assign matters 
to Article I adjudicators.  Sharif, 135 S. Ct. at 1951 (“Although Congress may assign some 
bankruptcy proceedings to non-Article III courts, there are limits to that power.”); see also Stern, 
564 U.S. at 510–11 (Breyer, J., dissenting); but see Pacemaker Diagnostic, 725 F.2d 537, 542–45.  
 83.   E.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 541 
(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc).  The decisions in Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984), and 
Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983), mirrored Pacemaker Diagnostic.  
For example, Wharton-Thomas downplayed the Article III concerns in the civil context because a 
magistrate judge “is truly a part of the district court, appointed by its judges and subject to dismissal 
by them.”  721 F.2d at 927.   
 84.   478 U.S. 833 (1986).  Schor has been described as “[t]he closest that the modern Supreme 
Court has ever come to explaining Article III’s internal distinction between structural and individual 
rights . . . .”  See Stephen Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and Article 
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concluded that the Commodity Exchange Act empowered the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) to decide state-law 
counterclaims in reparations proceedings.85  The majority addressed 
Article III concerns in two stages, separating a litigant’s personal right to 
an Article III adjudicator from the general public’s structural protection 
of judicial independence.  On the former point, the majority concluded 
that Schor had waived his personal right to have the counterclaim heard 
in a district court.86  For the structural analysis, the majority used a 
factor-based approach, which carried over to the more-recent bankruptcy 
cases regarding Article III limitations.87  Although the Schor majority 
found no Article III violation for the CFTC, it is noteworthy that Schor’s 
consent was not a factor in the structural analysis at all; consent mattered 
only for the personal right analysis.88  Justice Brennan dissented, joined 
by Justice Marshall, arguing for a strict reading of Article III with 
exceptions only for territorial courts, courts-martial, and public rights 
adjudications.89 
Northern Pipeline and Schor laid the groundwork for the Article III 
analysis that should have occurred in Peretz, for any confusion that 
might flow from the various opinions in Northern Pipeline was resolved 
by the seven-justice majority in Schor.  Justice O’Connor’s cogent Schor 
majority identified the limited relevance of litigant consent by dividing 
Article III protections into a personal right (waivable, such that consent 
matters) and a structural interest (unwaivable, such that consent does not 
matter).  Although relying on various factors in the structural analysis, 
Schor omitted consent entirely, and Schor was the key Article III 
precedent at the time Peretz was decided.  This logical and careful 
approach to considering consent in Article III analysis has been eroded 
by subsequent opinions—and Peretz was the first and most-damaging 
incursion. 
2. Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction over Civil Trials 
During the same decade as Northern Pipeline and Schor, many 
federal courts of appeals considered whether a magistrate judge could 
                                                            
III, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1542 (2007). 
 85.   Schor, 478 U.S. at 842–47.  
 86.   Id. at 848–50 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).  
 87.   Id. at 851; see also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); Stern v. 
Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011).  
 88.   Schor, 478 U.S. at 851–57. 
 89.   Id. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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preside over a civil trial with the parties’ consent without violating 
Article III, typically conducting a two-part inquiry looking at (1) the 
rights of the individual affected and (2) the structural effect on the 
independence of the judiciary.90  The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in 
Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc. is 
representative.91 
When analyzing a civil litigant’s “personal right to an Article III 
judge,” the Pacemaker Diagnostic majority had little trouble accepting a 
waiver by civil litigants because even criminal defendants may waive 
other fundamental rights.92  But this approach reflects the danger of 
elevating consent to a dispositive element.  Viewing the identity of the 
decisionmaker as a procedural issue, the Pacemaker Diagnostic majority 
compared waiver of an Article III judge to waiver of the lack of personal 
jurisdiction, deciding that it was unlike an unwaivable defect in subject-
matter jurisdiction.93  With respect to the individual right to an Article III 
judge, the Pacemaker Diagnostic majority was consistent with other 
decisions, but it did not conduct a separate Article III structural analysis 
independent of litigants’ consent.94  In this respect, Schor is particularly 
instructive; as with subject-matter jurisdiction, structural concerns extend 
beyond the individual litigant’s rights, so there must be some analysis of 
the power of the judicial officer to act.95 
The Pacemaker Diagnostic dissent raised two important arguments 
that would later appear in other contexts.  First, the consent (or lack 
thereof) by litigants was irrelevant, in the dissent’s view, because Article 
                                                            
 90.   Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 540–41 (9th 
Cir. 1984). 
 91.   See United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1985) (collecting cases). 
 92.   Pacemaker Diagnostic, 725 F.2d at 543. 
 93.   Id.  Recall that the basis for personal jurisdiction is due process (and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(k)), while the basis for subject-matter jurisdiction is actually Article III (and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332).  See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293–94 (1980); 
Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491–92 (1983).  Magistrate judge 
jurisdiction raises structural concerns and, therefore, is more akin to subject-matter jurisdiction. 
 94.   See Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 120 (2d. Cir. 1984) (“[T]he consent provision of 
section 636(c) provides a constraint against the wholesale delegation of judicial power to adjuncts of 
the district court.  Thus, it helps ensure that the delegation will not reach a magnitude that would 
trigger Article III concerns.”). 
 95.   The Pacemaker Diagnostic majority did not dwell on structural concerns that would still 
apply “despite waiver by affected parties” because district judges retained “extensive administrative 
control” and could resume jurisdiction “on [their] own initiative.”  725 F.2d at 544.  In the Ninth 
Circuit’s view, litigants’ ability to appeal also protected the judiciary from any improper influence of 
Congress in passing the Federal Magistrate Act.  Id. at 545–46.  This reasoning is circular.  If the 
delegation in Pacemaker Diagnostic was an Article III violation, the deferential review by the Ninth 
Circuit (which, in any event, is not well-situated to review the factual nuances considered by a trial 
judge) left the harm uncured. 
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III checks operate regardless of consent and because the burdened 
dockets that prompted the Federal Magistrates Act tend to coerce any 
waiver by a litigant.96  Second, the dissent framed the structural 
independence concern from the perspective of the particular presiding 
magistrate judge, not from the judiciary as a whole.  This perspective 
appreciates that each magistrate judge serves in a less-secure post than an 
Article III judge.97 
Specifically, magistrate judges serve eight-year terms (or just four-
year terms, if in a part-time capacity) rather than terms of life, must be 
reappointed upon turning seventy years old, and have their appointments 
and reappointments subject to review by a majority of district judges 
based on competence and the standards laid down by the Judicial 
Conference of the United States.98  They are subject to removal for cause 
(“incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical or mental 
disability”) or simply because their services “are no longer needed.”99  
District judges’ exercise of this power is protected by absolute judicial 
immunity, salary protection, and limited removal by Congress.100  
Empirical research—at least with respect to civil matters—indicates that 
magistrate judges do behave somewhat differently than district judges.101  
Specifically, in the civil contexts considered (a sampling of EEOC and 
civil cases from more than twenty districts), magistrate judges were 
seven percent more likely to produce defense verdicts in jury trials than 
district judges, but nine percent less likely to produce defense verdicts in 
bench trials.102  The same research also suggests that the ability of 
magistrate judges to write reports and recommendations that are accepted 
by district judges correlates with greater likelihood of being appointed as 
a life-tenured district judge.103  In short, the question of magistrate judges 
vs. district judges is not purely technical or theoretical: not respecting the 
balance demanded by § 636 and Article III could affect case outcomes. 
D. Magistrate Judges’ “Additional Duties” in Criminal Contexts 
The 1979 Act also authorized magistrate judges to try misdemeanor 
                                                            
 96.   Id. at 547 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). 
 97.   Id. 
 98.   28 U.S.C. § 631(e), (c), (j) (2012); see also § 631(a), (b).  
 99.   § 631(i). 
 100.   See Meyer v. Foti, 720 F. Supp. 1234, 1237, 1239–40 (E.D. La. 1989). 
 101.   Boyd, supra note 6 at, 981–82.  
 102.   Id. at 966–67. 
 103.   Id. at 980–81 (The number of magistrate-turned-district judges in the study was too small 
to be “statistically meaningful,” but the data still “point[ed] toward an auditioning effect.”). 
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criminal cases with consent.  Because the statute required consent for 
misdemeanors (in contrast to its silence regarding felonies),104 the 
defendant’s consent was a given in appellate review of these cases, 
which focused on Article III.105  In United States v. Dobey, the Tenth 
Circuit weighed consent heavily because it had played a role in then-
Justice Rehnquist’s Northern Pipeline concurrence, though the circuit 
opinion pre-dating Schor did not differentiate individual Article III rights 
from structural concerns.106  As some circuit decisions considered 
consent entirely dispositive of the Article III challenge, misdemeanor 
defendants were often reduced to arguing that the consent was 
unknowing or involuntary.107 
The expansion of magistrate judges’ duties in the criminal context 
went beyond misdemeanor trials and habeas proceedings.  Circuit splits 
arose as magistrates’ “additional duties” pushed beyond pretrial matters 
in felony cases, such as the suppression hearing at issue in Raddatz, as 
far as felony voir dire.108  When considering felony voir dire, federal 
appellate courts attempted to reconcile Wingo, Raddatz, and other 
decisions into a standard approach to the Additional Duties Clause, 
diverging based on the different weight given to the importance of the 
duties actually listed in § 636, the limitations imposed by Article III, and 
the effect of a defendant’s consent.109 
First, the statutory grant of authority to magistrate judges “to try 
persons accused of, and sentence persons convicted of, misdemeanors” 
appears to necessarily preclude felony trials by magistrate judges.110  
Nevertheless, the Second and Ninth Circuits omitted any discussion of 
the listed duties in § 636, treating voir dire as a pre-trial matter.111  The 
                                                            
 104.   18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (2012) (cross-referencing 
§ 3401). 
 105.   E.g., United States v. Byers, 730 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 106.   751 F.2d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 1985) (quoting Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. 
v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 542–43 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
 107.   751 F.2d at 1143.  Unsurprisingly, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reached the same 
conclusion, being bound by Pacemaker Diagnostic.  See United States v. Byers, 730 F.2d 568, 570 
(9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
 108.   Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892) (“[W]here the indictment is for a felony, 
the trial commences at least from the time the work of impaneling the jury begins.”). 
 109.   See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1432 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (discussing 
strong objections of Judicial Conference of the United States to the notion of magistrate judges 
conducting felony trials). 
 110.   18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(3) (2012).  See also, e.g., 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) (“Affirmative words are often, in their operation, 
negative of other objects than those affirmed; and in this case, a negative or exclusive sense must be 
given to them or they have no operation at all.”). 
 111.   See United States v. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1985) (beginning analysis with 
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lack of emphasis on the listed duties can be traced to the position of 
Chief Justice Burger, though it is difficult to reconcile with the 
methodology of the Wingo majority, which focused on the listed duties 
because Congress had “carefully circumscribed” the role of magistrate 
judges.112 
When a court focused on the listed duties, as the Wingo majority had, 
the analysis weighed against allowing magistrate judges to preside over 
felony voir dire.113  For example, a panel of the Eighth Circuit noted that, 
“Neither the timing nor the character of voir dire suggests its inclusion in 
the ‘additional duties’ provision.”114  Similarly, a majority of the en banc 
Fifth Circuit wove the whole tapestry together: 
 
Throughout the debate [in earlier Supreme Court cases], 
there was no suggestions that the Act authorized 
magistrates to conduct the trial of other than petty 
offenses.  The implicit assumption was that magistrates 
presiding over the trial of felonies was not envisioned, to 
a certainty – despite the presence of the additional duty 
language now said to allow magistrates to preside over 
jury selection in felony cases.115 
 
Federal courts also differed noticeably regarding the potential 
encroachment on the judiciary’s independence.  The differences were 
most evident in the framing of a district judge’s role in “reviewing” the 
already-selected jurors based on a transcript alone.  Because felony trials 
remained the exclusive province of Article III judges, they undeniably 
retained some control over juries during the trial itself.116  Indeed, this 
simplification allowed several decisions to conclude that the role of 
                                                            
Additional Duties Clause and ignoring listed duties entirely); United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 
1329 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he legislative history states in so many words that Congress considered the 
‘additional duties’ provision to be broad in scope and unrestricted by ‘any other specific grant of 
authority to magistrates.’”).  While the Garcia circuit decision may be forgiven for the generic 
statement that the Additional Duties Clause is “broad,” the lack of a citation is problematic, because 
Congress cautioned district judges to retain their “vital and traditional adjudicatory duties.”  United 
States v. Trice, 864 F.2d 1421, 1429 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 6162, 6172) (emphasis in original). 
 112.   Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 470 (1974). 
 113.   See Trice, 864 F.2d at 1426; Ford, 824 F.2d at 1435. 
 114.   Trice, 864 F.2d at 1428. 
 115.   Ford, 824 F.2d at 1432. 
 116.   See Bezold, 760 F.2d at 1002 (“[T]he district judge had an opportunity for full de novo 
review of the qualifications of the jurors when the panel appeared before the judge for the start of 
trial.  In addition the judge had wide discretion to disqualify jurors even after trial began.”). 
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district judges in the felony trial itself kept judicial power firmly 
“within” the judicial branch.117  Other decisions hewed closer to Wingo, 
however, recognizing that the cold record of voir dire cannot, as a 
practical matter, be reviewed or supplemented effectively by the trial 
judge.118  Further, the alienation of Article III authority to a non-Article 
III actor raises structural concerns, even when district judges retain a 
theoretical supervisory power.119 
Finally, the appellate cases of the 1980s divided over the importance 
of a defendant’s consent, express or implied.  Frequently, the defendant’s 
consent proved an irresistible ground for affirming an apparently-fair 
conviction, with the Article III and statutory requirements both being 
treated like any other waivable trial right.120  Alternatively, recognizing 
the requirement for a district judge at felony voir dire necessarily 
affected the consideration of consent.  For example, the Eighth Circuit 
held that a defendant could wait to object until he appeared before a 
district judge, reasoning that a magistrate judge had no power to be 
involved in felony voir dire at all,121 while the Ninth Circuit found only 
minimal Article III concerns and, accordingly, was willing to overlook a 
lack of consent entirely.122 
The most insightful distinctions between felony voir dire and the 
pre-trial criminal context (such as the suppression hearing at issue in 
Raddatz) came from the en banc Fifth Circuit in United States v. Ford.  
First, in the view of the majority, the “one-shot” nature of felony voir 
dire distinguished it from other additional duties: “Unlike dispositive 
pretrial motions, there is no opportunity to convince the jury afresh at 
trial.”123  Second, because jeopardy attaches upon the empaneling of the 
petit jury, it is very difficult to distinguish jury questioning and selection 
                                                            
 117.   See United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 1331 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he delegation of 
authority here occurs entirely within the judicial branch, a circumstance which alleviates greatly the 
underlying structural separation of powers concern with one branch’s encroaching upon the power 
of another.”) (emphasis in original). 
 118.   Ford, 824 F.2d at 1437 (noting that a second examination of a juror “would be a delicate 
exercise at best”). 
 119.   See id. at 1438. 
 120.   See, e.g., id. at 1438–39 (affirming where defendant did not object and “the trial was 
fundamentally fair”).  Ford has another notable feature: The concurrence of Judge E. Grady Jolly 
would view all issues related to voir dire as arising under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, setting 
aside Article III concerns, which makes his focus on a defendant’s consent less unusual than relying 
on consent to overcome a structural defect.  Id. at 1439–40 (Jolly, J., concurring). 
 121.   United States v. Trice, 864 F.2d 1421, 1429 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 122.   Bezold, 760 F.2d at 1001–02. 
 123.   Ford, 824 F.2d at 1437. 
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from the felony trial itself.124  The Ford court affirmed on the somewhat-
unusual ground that the trial was nevertheless “fundamentally fair”—a 
harmlessness analysis that has never been reflected in Supreme Court’s 
structural jurisprudence—but litigant consent alone could not cure the 
error.125 
In sum, the circuit decisions of the 1980s reflect a persisting divide 
in Article III jurisprudence.  Many courts viewed the use of magistrate 
judges as a reasonable (perhaps, to borrow from Peretz, 
“indispensable”)126 expedient presenting no serious danger because the 
Article I officers are conscientious and qualified.127  As the Eighth 
Circuit observed, however, “Since voir dire plays broader societal roles, 
we suspect that Congress did not intend to treat voir dire as simply 
preliminary,” and it is too important to be a mere “additional duty.”128  
The Supreme Court’s first decision regarding felony voir dire adopted 
the Eighth Circuit’s position. 
II. FELONY VOIR DIRE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT 
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court twice addressed felony 
voir dire.  First, it considered a magistrate judge’s authority when the 
defendant had not consented in Gomez v. United States.  Second, the 
Supreme Court addressed the same question in light of the defendant’s 
consent in Peretz v. United States. 
A. Felony Voir Dire Without Consent: Gomez v. United States 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari from the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Garcia,129 and the justices faced a fully preserved challenge 
in Gomez v. United States: The petitioners objected to a magistrate judge 
presiding over voir dire both at the time of jury selection and at the start 
of trial before the district judge.130  Nevertheless, the petitioners made no 
                                                            
 124.   Id. at 1435–36. 
 125.   Id. at 1439. 
 126.   Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991). 
 127.   See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 1324, 1325 (2d. Cir. 1988) (“There is no doubt 
that everything has its season, and there is a time when an accused is entitled to the presence of a 
federal district court judge.  But that season does not necessarily come with the commencement of 
the petit jury selection.”).  This article does not question the diligence of federal magistrate judges, 
but it recognizes that the distinction between magistrate judges and district judges matters.  See 
Boyd, supra note 6 at 981–82. 
 128.   United States v. Trice, 864 F.2d 1421, 1427–29 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 129.   Gomez v. United States, 488 U.S. 1003 (1989). 
 130.   490 U.S. 858, 860 (1989). 
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claim of prejudice, relying instead on the magistrate judge’s lack of 
authority under § 636 or, alternatively, under Article III and the Due 
Process Clause.131  The case produced a unanimous reversal, holding that 
felony voir dire was not one of the “additional duties” assignable to 
magistrate judges by statute. 
The Gomez opinion adhered to the narrow view of the Additional 
Duties Clause established by Wingo.  “When a statute creates an office to 
which it assigns specific duties, those duties outline the attributes of the 
office.  Any additional duties performed pursuant to a general 
authorization in the statute reasonably should bear some relation to the 
specified duties.”132  The basic proposition inclusio unius exclusio 
alterius is unremarkable,133 but this statement in the unanimous Gomez 
opinion seemed to resolve a dispute over § 636(b)(3) that dated back to 
Wingo.134 
Gomez also drew a line between civil and misdemeanor trials, for 
which the Federal Magistrates Act provided express authority, and felony 
trials.135  This distinction informed the analysis of felony voir dire 
because, since the late nineteenth century, the Court had held that “the 
[felony] trial commences at least from the time when the work of 
empanelling the jury begins.”136  Gomez then emphasized the voir dire 
was the “primary means” for ensuring that the trier of fact would be “free 
from ethnic, racial, or political prejudice.”137 
Having recognized the importance of voir dire, the Gomez opinion 
determined that it would be “incongruous” to assume that congressional 
silence allowed felony voir dire to be included as an “additional duty” 
under § 636(b)(3).138  The legislature’s silence meant the statute provided 
no standard of review to be applied by a district judge: Would Congress 
consider jury selection a “dispositive” matter subject to de novo review, a 
“non-dispositive” matter subject to review only for clear error, or a 
unique stage of the proceeding subject to different rules entirely?139  The 
lack of any clear answer, and the practical difficulty of reviewing jury 
                                                            
 131.   Id. at 860–62. 
 132.   Id. at 864.  
 133.   See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803). 
 134.   Compare Wingo, 418 U.S. at 470 (majority), with 418 U.S. at 481 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting).  
 135.   Gomez, 490 U.S. at 872. 
 136.   Id. at 873 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892)). 
 137.   Id.  After J.E.B v. Alabama, one could add “free from gender prejudice,” too.  511 U.S. 
127, 146 (1994). 
 138.   Gomez, 490 U.S. at 874. 
 139.   Id. at 873–77. 
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selection after the fact, led the Gomez decision to conclude that felony 
voir dire was better left to Article III judges.140 
Finally, the Gomez opinion rejected any requirement that a defendant 
show prejudice.141  Gomez introduced an unfortunate ambiguity, 
however, which has haunted subsequent § 636 jurisprudence.  It 
described the nature of the right to an Article III judge as follows: 
“Equally basic [with the right to an impartial adjudicator] is a 
defendant’s right to have all critical stages of a criminal trial conducted 
by a person with jurisdiction to preside.”142  The failure to clearly 
bifurcate the right to an Article III judge at voir dire into a trial right 
(potentially waivable) and a structural concern (unwaivable) departed 
from the guidance of Schor and did not resolve whether a defendant’s 
consent could be dispositive.  Still, the Gomez decision was consistent 
with the logic of Wingo in its narrow interpretation of § 636(b)(3), and 
the ambiguity regarding a defendant’s consent could have been resolved 
by applying Northern Pipeline and Schor. 
B. Felony Voir Dire with Consent in the Courts of Appeals 
In the wake of Gomez, appellate judges divided over the significance 
of a defendant’s consent.  A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed Darlina 
France’s conviction even though she had not objected to a magistrate 
judge conducting voir dire.143  The unanimous France opinion focused 
on three pillars of Gomez: (1) that Congress’s grant of authority in the 
Federal Magistrates Act “should be construed as an implicit withholding 
of the authority to preside at a felony trial”;144 (2) that jury selection is 
part of the criminal trial, and a critical part;145 and (3) that a district judge 
cannot meaningfully review voir dire because the presiding judge must 
scrutinize “gestures and attitudes of all participants to ensure the jury’s 
impartiality,” which is impossible from a cold transcript.146  The France 
decision concluded that magistrate judges lacked authority to conduct 
felony voir dire and the error “can never be treated as harmless.”147 
In contrast, other circuits held that the requirement of an Article III 
                                                            
 140.   Id. at 874–75. 
 141.   Id. at 876.  
 142.   Id.  
 143.   United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223, 229 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 144.   Id. at 225 (quoting Gomez, 490 U.S. at 872). 
 145.   Id. 
 146.   Id. at 225–26 (quoting Gomez, 490 U.S. at 875). 
 147.   Id. at 226 (quoting Gomez, 490 U.S. at 876), 229.  
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judge during felony voir dire was an individual trial right that could be 
waived, or even forfeited, by the defendant.148  When addressing the 
merits, these decisions focused on the defendant’s right to a jury (plainly 
known to be waivable149), often without addressing the source of the 
magistrate judge’s power or the structural concern about independence of 
the judiciary.150 
This narrow framing of the issue, although widespread in appellate 
majorities following Gomez, provoked multiple circuit judges to write 
separately to highlight the structural issue.  In his dissent from the First 
Circuit’s decision in Lopez-Peña, Senior Judge Bailey Aldrich explained 
that, to the extent that a magistrate judge acts outside statutory authority, 
“he [is] a man off the street.”151  Judge Mansmann’s concurrence in 
Virgin Islands v. Williams152 expressed similar concerns, noting that, 
“Jury selection [is] not within the ‘range of duties’ that Congress 
intended magistrates to perform” and consent could not “confer 
jurisdiction where the Act withholds it.”153  Finally, Judge Altimari 
dissented from the Second Circuit’s decision in favor of the government 
in United States v. Mang Sun Wong because, despite the defendant’s 
consent, the court should have “look[ed] no further than to the powers of 
the magistrate’s office.”154  Together with the France panel, Judges 
Aldrich, Altimari, and Mansmann recognized that consent could not be 
dispositive without distorting the concerns animating Gomez. 
                                                            
 148.   “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 
‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’”  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).  Most circuits agreed that 
Gomez applied retroactively, at least to the extent that it would reach criminal cases still on direct 
appeal.  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Peña, 912 F.2d 1542, 1544–45 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987)).   
 149.   See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a). 
 150.   See United States v. Lake, 910 F.2d 414, 417 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Jury selection is no more 
critical than [other] constitutionally guaranteed rights.”); Lopez-Peña, 912 F.2d at 1548 (discussing 
defendant’s “right to have an Article III judge” without considering Article III structural concerns).  
But see United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 1546 (2d Cir. 1989) (published order 
denying rehearing) (affirming conviction while acknowledging that “a magistrate’s performance of 
[felony voir dire] is not authorized by the Federal Magistrates Act” without focusing on defendant’s 
jury trial right). 
 151.   912 F.2d at 1552 (Aldrich, S.J., dissenting). 
 152.   892 F.2d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 1989).  The Third Circuit panel majority held that “the Federal 
Magistrates Act permits a district court to delegate voir dire to a magistrate as an ‘additional duty,’ 
so long as the defendant expresses no objection.” Id. 
 153.   Id. at 312–13 (Mansmann, J., concurring) (quoting Gomez, 109 S. Ct. at 2242).  Judge 
Mansmann concurred, rather than dissenting, because Williams had not shown plain error. 
 154.   884 F.2d at 1546 (Altimari, J., dissenting). 
172 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
C. The Misstep in Peretz v. United States 
The Supreme Court revisited the issue of magistrate judge155 
jurisdiction over felony voir dire in a case in which the defendants had 
consented: Peretz v. United States.156  In a 5-4 decision that provoked 
multiple dissents, the Court departed from several principles common to 
past Federal Magistrates Act and Article III cases (and reaffirmed just 
two years before in the unanimous Gomez opinion).  The deviations in 
Peretz prove difficult to fully explain, particularly given that Justice 
Stevens authored Gomez, Peretz, and subsequently Nguyen (vacating 
Ninth Circuit opinions based on the presence of an Article IV judge, 
without statutory authority, despite having a quorum of two Article III 
judges157).  The decisions are not persuasively reconcilable, and this 
article should be read with regard for its appreciation of the analyses in 
Gomez and Nguyen—and, therefore, its deep concern over the contrary 
reasoning in Peretz. 
The Peretz majority began by reviewing the circuit split on the 
importance of a defendant’s consent in the wake of Gomez, though it 
almost ignored the limited role of consent in Schor (relegated to a 
footnote).158  The majority skirted much of the rationale of Gomez by 
concluding that consent substantially changed the character of both the 
constitutional and statutory questions raised by having a non-Article III 
judge at felony voir dire.159  As part of its effort to cabin Gomez, the 
majority fell back on a trite point about the workload of federal trial 
courts: “Given the bloated dockets that district courts have now come to 
expect as ordinary, the role of the magistrate in today’s federal judicial 
system is nothing less than indispensable.”160  In a footnote, the Peretz 
majority pressed the point: “[T]he system created by the Federal 
                                                            
 155.   The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 provided that a “magistrate” would “be known as 
a United States magistrate judge,” but it made no substantive change to section 636.  Pub. L. 101-
650 (Dec. 1, 1990).  (For anyone inclined to view the title change as substantive, see Romeo and 
Juliet, Act II, Sc. 2, Lns. 43–51). 
 156.   501 U.S. 923 (1991).  In fact, the Court had tried to address the question even sooner, on 
certiorari from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in France, but the justices split 4-4.  See United States v. 
France, 498 U.S. 335 (1991).  The confirmation of Justice Souter allowed the Court to break the tie 
later in the October 1990 term. See Richard L. Berke, Senate Confirms Souter 90 to 9, As Supreme 
Court’s 105th Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/03/us/senate-
confirms-souter-90-to-9-as-supreme-court-s-105th-justice.html [https://perma.cc/T84Q-M5ZT]. 
 157.   Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 82–83 (2003).  See note 27, supra. 
 158.   Peretz, 501 U.S. at 926–27 (quoting United States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493, 502 (2d 
Cir. 1990)). 
 159.   Id. at 927–28, 932–33.  
 160.   Id. at 928 (quoting Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
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Magistrates Act has exceeded the highest expectations of the legislators 
who conceived it.”161  That observation deserves particular reflection, for 
it acknowledges that district courts’ delegation of certain work to non-
Article III adjudicators has been embraced by the judiciary itself to a 
greater extent than Congress intended.162 
Continuing with the Federal Magistrates Act analysis, the Peretz 
majority ignored the many decisions emphasizing the importance of 
felony voir dire and concluded that “supervision of entire civil and 
misdemeanor trials” by a magistrate judge is “comparable in 
responsibility and importance to presiding over voir dire at a felony 
trial.”163  In doing so, the Court acknowledged that it was making a 
policy choice but was “confiden[t]” “that this reading of the additional 
duties clause strikes the balance Congress intended between the interests 
of the criminal defendant and the policies that undergird the Federal 
Magistrates Act.”164  This result has only weak support in the legislative 
history, as the majority referenced just one letter suggesting that a 
defendant’s consent could affect a magistrate judge’s power to preside.165 
The Peretz majority then challenged the notion that structural 
constitutional protections are unwaivable because “litigants may waive 
their personal right to have an Article III judge preside over a civil trial” 
and “basic rights of criminal defendants are similarly subject to 
waiver.”166  Nevertheless, the majority presented alternative analysis 
“assuming that a litigant may not waive structural protections provided 
by Article III.”167  Of course, there was no need to “assume” that Article 
III involved distinct personal right and structural components: Schor (and 
subsequent decisions, such as Stern) instruct that individual and 
structural protections are separate questions, and that consent is relevant 
                                                            
 161.   Id. at 928 n.5 (quoting Williams, 892 F.2d at 308). 
 162.   Gomez counsels against this very line of thought animating Peretz when it states that 
Congress sets the specific duties for Article I officers.  See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 
864, 874–876 (“When a statute creates an office to which it assigns specific duties, those duties 
outline the attributes of the office.”).  The Peretz majority used the overall efficiency advantage of 
delegating work to magistrate judges to minimize the importance of the inquiry into the 
permissibility of delegation under the Federal Magistrates Act and Article III.   
 163.   Peretz, 501 U.S. at 933.  The court presents a similar gloss on the issue later when 
acknowledging that meaningful district judge review of jury selection would be “difficult” but 
concluding that magistrate judges have experience in observing witnesses and determining 
credibility.  Id. at 936 n.12. 
 164.   Id. at 933–34. 
 165.   Id. at 935 n.11. 
 166.   Id. at 936. 
 167.   Id. at 937. 
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to the former but not the latter.168  The majority concluded that district 
judge supervision of a magistrate judge sufficed to overcome any 
structural issue,169 a conclusion at odds with the Peretz majority’s earlier 
observation that district judge review of voir dire would be “difficult.”170 
The Peretz dissents comprehensively countered the majority’s 
reasoning.  Justice Marshall, joined by Justices White and Blackmun, 
focused on Gomez,171 for the “reasoning in Gomez makes clear that the 
absence or presence of consent is entirely irrelevant to the Federal 
Magistrates Act’s prohibition upon magistrate jury selection in a felony 
trial” and “the majority resolves the constitutional question in a manner 
entirely inconsistent with our controlling precedents.”172  Justice 
Marshall defined the issue in Peretz as “jury selection in a felony 
trial,”173 for voir dire represents the beginning of a felony trial under 
Lewis and sets up the “attachment of jeopardy” with the empaneling of 
the jury.174  This more-precise framing of the question produces a more 
compelling opinion than the majority. 
Justice Marshall’s dissent turned first to the Additional Duties Clause 
and notes that magistrate judge participation in felony trials undermines 
the very purpose of the Federal Magistrates Act, which was to increase 
“time available to [district] judges for the careful and unhurried 
performance of their vital and traditional adjudicatory duties”—duties 
that include felony trial and voir dire.175  After all, Congress expressly 
provided “a magistrate’s limited authority to conduct misdemeanor and 
civil trials,” thereby implicitly prohibiting supervision of felony trial,176 
and Gomez had recognized that Congress understood voir dire to be part 
of a felony trial.177  Finally, Justice Marshall’s dissent criticized the 
                                                            
 168.   Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851–57. 
 169.   Peretz, 501 U.S. at 937. 
 170.   Id. at 935 n.12 (citing Gomez, 490 U.S. at 873–76). 
 171.   Id. at 941 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall’s criticism of the majority for 
“interpretive gymnastics” was trendsetting, as similar analogies have appeared in many subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions.  See Douglas Abrams, Sports in the Courts: The Role of Sports References 
in Judicial Opinions, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 15 (2010). 
 172.   Id. at 941 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 173.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 174.   See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892); see also, e.g., Gomez, 490 U.S. at 
873. 
 175.   Peretz, 501 U.S. at 942 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, p. 12 
(1976)) (emphasis in original). 
 176.   Id. at 943 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 177.   Id. at 943 n.2 (citing Gomez, 490 U.S. at 873).  Justice Marshall also reiterated that district 
judge review of voir dire is not meaningful and observed that the majority was requiring only oral 
consent by defense counsel, not written consent by the defendant himself, demonstrating striking 
insight by anticipating the question in Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008).  Id. at 944–48 
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majority for “creating authority for magistrates,”178 a criticism consistent 
with the later Nguyen decision.179 
Turning to the constitutional question, Justice Marshall’s dissent 
focused on the unwaivable structural concern: “Although parties may 
waive their personal guarantee of an independent Article III adjudicator, 
parties may not waive Article III’s structural guarantee.”180  If a 
magistrate judge’s supervision of felony voir dire was allowed under the 
Federal Magistrates Act, Congress has attempted to exercise its Article I 
power to “impermissibly intrude on the province of the judiciary” and its 
Article III power.181  Justice Marshall explained that district judges 
cannot meaningfully review felony voir dire on a cold transcript, and the 
lack of meaningful review prevents delegation of Article III power under 
both Raddatz and Schor.182 
Justice Scalia also dissented from the Peretz decision, though he 
wrote separately to build on Justice Marshall’s criticisms by considering 
the judiciary’s delegation of its own power.183  On the merits, Justice 
Scalia expressed “general agreement with Justice Marshall,”184 and 
asserted that the “canon of ejusdem generis [i.e., general wording 
accompanied by a list should be restrictively interpreted to things of the 
same type] keeps the ‘additional duties’ clause from swallowing up the 
rest of” the Federal Magistrates Act.185  The judiciary also may not “itself 
alienate its assigned powers,” rebutting the majority’s assertion that 
district judge supervision can cure any Article III concern regarding a 
magistrate judge’s conduct of particular judicial functions.186  In short, 
even if the Additional Duties Clause allowed magistrate judge 
supervision of felony voir dire, Article III judges should not have 
accepted Congress’s invitation to alienate their core judicial power. 
                                                            
(Marshall, J., dissenting).   
 178.   Id. at 948. 
 179.   See 539 U.S. 69, 78–79. 
 180.   Peretz, 501 U.S. at 950 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 181.   Id. at 950; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851–52 
(1986).  The Peretz majority’s result is “particularly unfortunate” because “the most coherent 
reading of the Federal Magistrates Act,” i.e., that magistrates may not conduct felony voir dire, 
“avoids [Article III] problems entirely.”  Peretz, 501 U.S. at 952 (Marshall, J., dissenting).   
 182.   Id. at 951–52 & n.7 (citing Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683 (majority), 685 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring), and citing Schor, 478 U.S. at 853).  
 183.   Peretz, 501 U.S. at 952–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  With typical thoroughness, Justice 
Scalia began with the question of forfeiture and concluded that the Court should overlook Peretz’s 
failure to object because Gomez was decided after his conviction.   
 184.   Id. at 955 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 185.   Id. (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989)). 
 186.   Id. at 956 (emphasis in original). 
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D. Tracing the Threads Cut by Peretz 
The Peretz majority departed from several threads that had 
developed over the prior two decades.  The listed duties in § 636 had 
been critical guideposts for analysis of the Additional Duties Clause from 
the start in Wingo187 and again in Gomez.188  Although the Court had 
quoted some legislative history encouraging experimentation with 
magistrate judges in Mathews v. Weber,189 that case involved only 
preliminary review of an administrative record, which can be fully 
reviewed by a district judge from the same record later (unlike when a 
magistrate judge presides over live proceedings).190  Raddatz upheld 
magistrate judge jurisdiction over suppression hearings, yet that 
assignment was permitted by the express language of § 636(b)(1)(A) 
with a standard of review (de novo determination, but not de novo 
hearing) also provided by § 636(b)(1)(B).191  The assignment of felony 
voir dire permitted in Peretz required substantial innovation by the 
judiciary itself.192  In addition to reading a consent requirement for felony 
voir dire into the Additional Duties Clause by questionable analogy to 
civil and misdemeanor trials (and creating a new question about who 
must give that consent193), the Supreme Court majority developed the 
standard of review out of whole cloth194 (de novo determination by a 
district judge, but only upon request of the parties).195  It also overlooked 
multiple indications that Congress viewed voir dire as part of trial 
(specifically, “its passage in 1975 of the Speedy Trial Act and its 
placement of rules pertaining to criminal petit juries in a chapter entitled 
                                                            
 187.   Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 470 (1974). 
 188.   Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864. 
 189.   423 U.S. 261, 267 (1976) (quoting Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act Before 
Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 81 (1968)) (“We hope and 
think that innovative, imaginative judges who want to clean up their caseload backlog will utilize the 
U.S. magistrates in these areas and perhaps even come up with new areas to increase the efficiency 
of their courts.”). 
 190.   Id. at 270. 
 191.   United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 675 (1980) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, at 3) 
(“The use of the words ‘de novo determination’ is not intended to require the judge to actually 
conduct a new hearing on contested issues.”) (emphasis in original). 
 192.   See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 935–37. 
 193.   See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249–51 (2008) (majority); id. at 266–67 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 194.   Cf. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 at 874 (“It is incongruous to assume that 
Congress implicitly required [de novo] review for jury selection yet failed even to mention that 
matter in the statute.”). 
 195.   Peretz, 501 U.S. at 939 (1991). 
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‘Trial.’”196). 
The Article III analysis in Peretz was similarly out of step with the 
separation-of-powers cases of the 1980s.  Indeed, the analysis of Peretz 
has been described as a Due Process Test (with balancing reminiscent of 
Matthews v. Eldridge197), which reflects Justice White’s Northern 
Pipeline dissent rather than Justice Brennan’s plurality or Justice 
Rehnquist’s concurrence.198  The structural analysis in Peretz was also at 
odds with the Schor majority, which had resolved the ambiguity about 
the role of consent in the various Northern Pipeline opinions by 
considering consent only with respect to the individual’s right to an 
Article III adjudicator, not the separate structural concern.199  Instead, 
Peretz used consent in its structural analysis in a way that made consent 
entirely dispositive,200 for Peretz could be read to allow Article III judges 
to alienate judicial power of any kind (with litigant consent) as long as 
they can theoretically claw the power back in other similar cases, though 
without meaningful review in any particular delegated case.201  This 
reality prompted Justice Scalia’s admonition that “the Constitution 
guarantees not merely that no branch will be forced by one of the other 
branches to let someone else exercise its assigned powers—but that none 
of the branches will itself alienate its assigned powers.”202  Finally, the 
Peretz majority failed to value voir dire as a significant moment in 
felony proceedings for both structural and practical purposes (despite 
acknowledging that voir dire is a “critical stage” of proceedings).203 
In sum, the tenuous Peretz majority allowed pragmatism to override 
valid concerns that animated related Supreme Court precedent on the 
                                                            
 196.   Gomez, 490 U.S. at 873 (citations omitted). 
 197.   424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 198.   See Hinde, supra note 10 at 1171–73.  In fact, Peretz arguably expanded on Justice 
White’s position that “[t]here [is] no difference in principle between the work that Congress may 
assign to an Art. I court and that which the Constitution assigns to Art. III courts,” Northern Pipeline 
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 113 (White, J., dissenting), by allowing the 
Article III courts themselves to alienate power through an elastic interpretation of the Additional 
Duties Clause.  See Hinde, supra note 10 at 1173. 
 199.   See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 883, 848–51 (1986) (citing 
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80 n.31 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)). 
 200.   See Huffman, supra note 28 at 1355. 
 201.   See Hessick, supra note 19 at 730–31. 
 202.   Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 956 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). 
 203.   Id. at 933; but see id. at 929 n.6 (noting that voir dire is a “critical stage” of a felony trial).  
Peretz should have recognized that voir dire was critical enough to demand an Article III 
adjudicator, which would have vindicated the importance of voir dire instead of paying it mere lip 
service.  See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374 (1892); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 
511 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1994).   
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construction of § 636, the structural protections in Article III, and the 
importance of voir dire.  A review of post-Peretz cases reveals how the 
analysis in Peretz was a deviation from the overall arc of Article III 
jurisprudence rather than a meaningful course-correction. 
III. JUDICIAL POWER IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Despite the deviations of the Peretz majority from other authoritative 
cases, commentators continue to rely heavily upon its analysis,204 
especially as recent decisions regarding the power of bankruptcy judges 
(with and without litigants’ consent205) have rekindled interest in the 
power of magistrate judges.  Nevertheless, allowing magistrate judge 
jurisdiction over felony voir dire remains difficult to reconcile with 
contemporary cases on judicial power.  Peretz is still an outlier with 
respect to interpretation of statutory grants of judicial power, the use of 
consent as a dispositive factor in Article III structural analysis, and the 
integrity of the felony criminal process. 
A. Statutory Authority of Non-Article III Judges: Nguyen v. United 
States 
In Nguyen, the Supreme Court majority held that appellate panels of 
the Ninth Circuit consisting of two Article III judges and one Article IV 
judge lacked the authority to decide the appeals of federal criminal 
convictions at all.206  The statute at issue, 28 U.S.C. § 292(a), allowed 
“the chief judge of a circuit to assign ‘one or more district judges within 
the circuit’ to sit on the court of appeals.”207  The Article IV judges who 
had participated sat on the District Courts of Guam and the Northern 
Mariana Islands (both within the Ninth Circuit), and the question was 
whether these Article IV judges qualified as “district judges” under the 
statute and, if not, whether the error required vacatur of the appellate 
opinions.208  Neither petitioner had objected to the composition of the 
panel nor even sought rehearing before the Ninth Circuit.209 
The Nguyen majority by Justice Stevens (in an encore of Gomez 
                                                            
 204.   See, e.g., Chesley, supra note 23, at 768. 
 205.   See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); Stern v. Marshall, 564 
U.S. 462 (2011). 
 206.   Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 73–74 (2003).  
 207.   Id. at 74. 
 208.   Id. at 72 n.4, 74. 
 209.   Id. at 73. 
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rather than Peretz) held that the designation of “district judges” under 
statute is restricted to Article III judges.210  The analysis involved a 
comprehensive review of the use of “district judges” in Title 28, and the 
majority noted that § 133(a) enumerates every judicial district and 
provides that “the President shall appoint, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, district judges.”211  Despite the defendants’ failure 
to object or demonstrate prejudice,212 the Nguyen majority drew a 
practical and useful line for when consent matters and when it does not: a 
judicial arrangement that is merely “irregular” requires analysis for 
prejudice, but one that is “impermissible” does not.213  As the use of 
Article IV judges was entirely impermissible under § 292(a), the 
majority reversed and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for hearing 
before a properly-constituted panel.214  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Nguyen 
dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer, would have 
instead applied plain error review, under which the failure to show 
prejudice would have been fatal.215 
Nguyen reaffirmed the importance of Congress’s grant of statutory 
authority to federal courts, especially with respect to the participation of 
non-Article III judges.  The rigorous review of statutory context in 
Nguyen is consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach to interpreting 
the Additional Duties Clause from Wingo and Gomez.216  On the other 
hand, Peretz ignored evidence that Congress did not intend a broad 
reading of the Additional Duties Clause, such as Congress’s expressed 
intent that a federal magistrate judge would “assist the district judge to 
                                                            
 210.   Id. at 76. 
 211.   Id. at 74–75 (also quoting 28 U.S.C. § 134(a), providing that district judges hold office 
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 212.   The Nguyen majority determined that the Ninth Circuit had “so far departed from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court’s 
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United States, 748 F.3d 1045 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 213.   Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 79. 
 214.   Id. at 83. 
 215.   Id. at 83–89 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (applying United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 
(1993)). 
 216.   See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989) (“[T]he carefully defined grant of 
authority [to magistrate judges] to conduct trial of civil matters and of minor criminal cases should 
be construed as an implicit withholding of the authority to preside at a felony trial.”); Wingo v. 
Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 471–73 (1974) (considering the importance of hearings, in particular, with a 
granular analysis in footnote 11). 
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the end that the [Article III] judge could have more time to preside at the 
trial of cases.”217  Nguyen also counseled that, for violations that could 
never occur even with consent (i.e., those that are entirely 
impermissible), reversal should occur regardless of consent or 
demonstrable prejudice.218  Finally, Nguyen reflected that any 
participation by even one improper judicial officer can undermine the 
entire proceeding, for the presence of a quorum of Article III judges on 
the Ninth Circuit panels failed to cure the error.219 
The Peretz majority’s conflict with Nguyen reflects the oddity of its 
statutory analysis.  When decided, Peretz already conflicted with the 
reasoning in Gomez that, “Any additional duties performed pursuant to a 
general authorization in the statute reasonably should bear some relation 
to the specified duties.”220  Gomez recognized that voir dire was 
comparable in importance to the presentation of evidence and arguments 
at felony trials.221  Congress itself indicated that the Federal Magistrates 
Act was intended to free district judges for availability at trial,222 which 
makes the use of magistrate judges in trial contexts, such as voir dire, 
puzzling.  Finally, the Supreme Court in Batson observed that voir dire is 
not particularly burdensome for courts to supervise.223 
In light of Nguyen, the proper statutory analysis of “additional 
duties” should begin with the listed duties and note the increased 
importance of felony matters compared with misdemeanor and civil 
trials.  The analysis should review the listed duties as limiting principles, 
not simply examples for broad experimentation.  Because involving 
magistrate judges in felony voir dire raises a difficult Article III 
inquiry—and, as the next section demonstrates, probably contravenes 
constitutional separation of powers—analysis of the Federal Magistrates 
Act should avoid the issue entirely unless Congress chooses to address 
felony voir dire explicitly (as it did for habeas proceedings following 
Wingo224).  In short, the result in Nguyen revealed that Peretz is based on 
diametrically-opposed premises: that voir dire is merely a preliminary 
“additional” duty yet burdensome enough that Article III judges need the 
                                                            
 217.   Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 942 n.1 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting S. 
Rep. No. 96-74 (1979) (regarding the amendments in the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979)). 
 218.   Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 81. 
 219.   Id. at 82. 
 220.   Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864. 
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 222.   See S. Rep. No. 96-74, at 3 (1979). 
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option to share the work with Article I officers.  Nguyen also 
reinvigorated the rationale of Wingo and Gomez by explaining that 
“Congress’ decision to preserve the Article III character of the courts of 
appeals is more than a trivial concern . . . and is entitled to respect.”225 
B. Federal Bankruptcy Judge Jurisdiction: Stern v. Marshall and 
Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif 
The Supreme Court thrust the issue of Article III limits on the 
authority of Article I judges into the legal spotlight in 2011 with its 
landmark decision in Stern v. Marshall.226  Four years later, the Court 
substantially limited the impact of Stern by again turning to consent as a 
factor in Article III analysis in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. 
Sharif.227  Even with the evident differences in the Stern and Sharif 
majorities, neither redeems the reasoning and result in Peretz. 
In Stern, a federal bankruptcy judge had adjudicated a state-law 
counterclaim for tortious interference in a bankruptcy proceeding 
because it would augment the bankruptcy estate.228  (Such state-law 
claims are often termed “Stern claims.”229)  At issue was whether Article 
I bankruptcy judges possess the statutory and constitutional authority to 
adjudicate Stern claims and enter final judgments.230  The majority, 
written by Chief Justice Roberts, concluded that bankruptcy judges’ 
statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 157 extended to all claims arising 
under Title 11 and in a Title 11 case, including the state-law tortious 
interference counterclaim.231  The majority closely scrutinized the 
language and structure of § 157, noting that Congress “catalog[ued] 16 
different types of proceedings that should receive ‘core’ treatment” in 
§ 157(b)(2), but Congress did not specify how to distinguish within that 
list between claims arising under Title 11 and claims that merely arise in 
a bankruptcy case.232  The Court further noted that describing a category 
of “core” proceedings that are merely “related to” a case would be oddly 
inconsistent, and “oxymoron is not a typical feature of congressional 
                                                            
 225.   Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 80 (citation omitted).  
 226.   564 U.S. 462 (2011). 
 227.   135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
 228.   Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 468–69 (2011). 
 229.   Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2172 (2014). 
 230.   Stern, 564 U.S. at 472–74.  
 231.   Id. at 476.  Federal bankruptcy judges are appointed for fourteen-year terms by the Court 
of Appeals for the Circuit in which the District Court is located.  28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2012); see 
Stern, 564 U.S. at 473. 
 232.   Stern, 564 U.S. at 477. 
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drafting.”233  Nevertheless, the broad statutory designation of “core” 
proceedings created a constitutional issue.234 
The Stern majority explained, “Article III could neither serve its 
purpose in the system of checks and balances nor preserve the integrity 
of judicial decisionmaking if the other branches of the Federal 
Government could confer the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities 
outside Article III.”235  The majority concluded that the amendments to 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 following the Northern Pipeline decision (in 
which the Court held that a bankruptcy judge could not enter final 
judgment on state common-law claims) did not resolve Article III 
concerns.236  “It is clear that the Bankruptcy Court in this case exercised 
the ‘judicial Power of the United States’ in purporting to resolve and 
enter final judgment on a state common law claim, just as the court did in 
Northern Pipeline.”237 
The Stern majority touches on many issues,238 but three points are 
particularly relevant to this article.  First, when interpreting 
Congressional delegations of judicial authority, the categories laid out by 
Congress are critical, and the majority carefully considered the entire 
structure of the relevant statute.239  Second, Congress cannot alienate 
judicial authority where the specific right or claim exists independent of 
the will of the federal legislature.240  Third, an Article I adjudicator is 
only an “adjunct” to the district courts (and, therefore, unable to offend 
Article III) if the decision is subject to full review by an Article III 
judge.241  All these elements are absent when a magistrate judge presides 
over felony voir dire: section 636 excepts felony trial (of which voir dire 
                                                            
 233.   Id. (citing Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 
(Brennan, J., plurality). 
 234.   The Stern majority also addressed bankruptcy judge jurisdiction under § 157(b)(5), and its 
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 235.   Stern, 564 U.S. at 484.  To emphasize the importance of separation of powers and Article 
III judges’ life tenure, the majority quoted from The Federalist Papers and The Spirit of Laws.  Id. at 
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 239.   Id. at 476–77. 
 240.   Id. at 493 (“The claim is instead one under state common law between two private parties.  
It does not depend on the will of [C]ongress; Congress has nothing to do with it.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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2018 CONSENT CANNOT CONTROL 183 
is a component) from a magistrate judge’s authority; the Constitution 
establishes jury trial rights, which are not subject to the will of Congress; 
and voir dire is not subject to meaningful review by a district judge from 
a cold transcript. 
Justice Breyer’s Stern dissent offered a different approach to Article 
III analysis, grounded more in the factor-based analysis of Schor than the 
formalism of Northern Pipeline, and his approach merits review before 
considering the subsequent Sharif decision and the effect of litigants’ 
consent on bankruptcy judges’ authority.  The Stern dissent encouraged a 
“more pragmatic approach” that would find an Article III infirmity where 
“one branch of Government sought to aggrandize its own constitutionally 
delegated authority by encroaching upon a field of authority that the 
Constitution assigns exclusively to another branch.”242  For that inquiry, 
the dissent embraced several factors: 
 
(1) the nature of the claim to be adjudicated, (2) the 
nature of the non-Article III tribunal, (3) the extent to 
which Article III courts exercise control over the 
proceeding, (4) the presence or absence of the parties’ 
consent, and (5) the nature and importance of the 
legislative purpose served by the grant of adjudicatory 
authority to a tribunal with judges who lack Article III’s 
tenure and compensation protections.243 
The Supreme Court majority adopted a less-searching Article III 
structural analysis than in Stern when considering bankruptcy litigants’ 
consent in Wellness International, Ltd. v. Sharif.244  Wellness 
International sought a declaratory judgment against Sharif, a debtor who 
filed bankruptcy under Chapter 7, to bring the assets of a living trust 
within the bankruptcy estate, and Sharif participated in the proceedings 
(apart from a pattern of non-compliance with discovery) until Stern was 
decided.245  The Seventh Circuit determined that the structural Article III 
problem posed by allowing a bankruptcy judge to preside could not be 
waived, so Sharif’s failure to object was not fatal.246 
The Supreme Court majority, written by Justice Sotomayor, 
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 243.   Id. at 513.   
 244.   135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
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reversed.  The Sharif majority began with the familiar refrain that “the 
number of magistrate and bankruptcy judgeships exceeds the number of 
circuit and district judgeships” and that, without Article I judges, “the 
work of the federal court system would grind nearly to a halt.”247  After a 
short review of nineteenth-century arbitration cases, the majority 
reaffirmed the existence of two prongs of Article III analysis: a litigant’s 
personal right to “an impartial and independent federal adjudication,” 
which may be waived, and the structural interest in “checks and 
balances,” which may not be waived.248  The Sharif majority then 
explained the importance of consent in Article III analysis because the 
right to a life-tenured adjudicator is a “personal right” subject to waiver 
“so long as Article III courts retain supervisory authority over the 
process,” which obviates any structural concern.249 
The Sharif majority reviewed the nature of bankruptcy courts to 
determine whether the district courts retain sufficient supervisory 
authority, including comparison to the supervision of magistrate judges 
as explained in Peretz.250  In short, bankruptcy judges are appointed and 
subject to removal by Article III judges, serve as integral parts of the 
district courts, and gain jurisdiction only by referral from the district 
courts.251  Drawing on Justice Breyer’s Stern dissent, the majority also 
noted that bankruptcy judge jurisdiction is not an attempt by Congress 
“to aggrandize itself or humble the Judiciary.”252  Accordingly, the 
majority discerned no structural infirmity. 
Chief Justice Roberts dissented in Sharif, joined in full by Justice 
Scalia and in part by Justice Thomas.253  As in the Stern majority, the 
Chief Justice’s Sharif dissent recounted the American colonial 
experience of “intermingled legislative and judicial powers.”254  The 
dissent quickly returned to the Northern Pipeline plurality, noting that 
non-Article III adjudicators have general jurisdiction only in territories 
                                                            
 247.   Sharif, 135 S. Ct. at 1938–39. 
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(and the District of Columbia) and are otherwise confined to military 
tribunals, disputes over “public rights,” and limited bankruptcy 
proceedings.255  To the extent a claim was a Stern claim, Congress could 
not assign adjudicatory power to an Article I officer and a litigant could 
not grant that power through a waiver.256  To emphasize the point, the 
dissent listed numerous cases involving the structural separation of other 
branches, such as NLRB v. Noel Canning and INS v. Chadha, which 
could not be cured by the consent of particular actors.257 
The Chief Justice’s Sharif dissent complained that the Sharif 
majority’s result could only be reached through “an imaginative 
reconstruction of Stern.”258  That criticism may inspire deja vu, for 
Justice Marshall bemoaned the contortions required of the Peretz 
majority to reach a result inconsistent with Gomez.259  Despite some 
similarities with Peretz, the Sharif decision does not (and could not) 
rehabilitate Peretz.  As a threshold matter, Sharif can only assist with 
respect to Article III, for the delegation of Stern claims to bankruptcy 
judges is plainly permitted by § 157, where the delegation of felony voir 
dire to magistrate judges as an “additional duty” is more doubtful.  Even 
when focusing on Article III, however, the Stern claims at issue in Sharif 
remain meaningfully distinct from federal felony voir dire. 
First, the Sharif majority built on Justice Breyer’s Stern dissent, 
which had already concluded that a multi-factor analysis favored 
allowing delegation of Stern claims to bankruptcy judges.  Federal felony 
voir dire is quite different from Stern claims, as reflected by application 
of Justice Breyer’s five factors to the issue in Peretz.  Only one factor—
the defendant’s consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction—favors the 
result in Peretz.  The nature of the non-Article III tribunal does not weigh 
strongly in either direction: Magistrate judges are competent and 
qualified civil servants, but a recent statistical study suggests that 
magistrate judge outcomes are meaningfully different from district judge 
outcomes (at least in civil contexts).260  Justice Breyer’s first three factors 
weigh strongly against the result in Peretz: (1) adjudication of a 
defendant’s guilt or innocence to federal felony charges is as important 
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as a judicial function can be; (2) Article III judges exercise very little 
control over the proceeding because only limited review of voir dire is 
possible from a cold transcript;261 and (3) fair voir dire is critical, both to 
trial outcomes and “public respect for our criminal justice system,” 
balanced against only limited administrative burdens.262 
Second, federal felony proceedings are fundamentally different from 
state-law counterclaims in the bankruptcy context.  A judge with life 
tenure and salary protections might never have decided Stern claims, 
because the state-law claims could have been brought in a state forum, 
where trial judges are often limited to terms of years and could even be 
subject to partisan elections.263  In contrast, a federal felony charge must 
be adjudicated in federal district court.  Article III demands a district 
judge at federal felony trial and other critical stages (such as voir dire) 
because there is no alternate forum at which a judge lacking Article III 
protections might preside.264  In other words, short of the expansive 
reading of the Additional Duties Clause in Peretz, there would be no 
opportunity for an adjudicator without life tenure and salary protection to 
participate in the most significant aspects of federal felony proceedings. 
Taken together, the Stern and Sharif majorities present a paradox, 
particularly through the contrary indications as to whether a narrow 
reading of Northern Pipeline or an expansive reading of Schor provides a 
better blueprint for Article III structural analysis.  One need not resolve 
that tension, however, to recognize that the result in Peretz is dangerous.  
Through the lens of separation of powers or federalism, Stern claims are 
not nearly as significant as federal felony voir dire.  Sharif could consign 
the state-law claims at issue to Article I bankruptcy judges without 
imperiling duties that should be exclusively reserved for Article III 
judges.  To the extent that Sharif suggested results in the criminal 
context, those pronouncements are purely dicta.  Rather than focusing 
narrowly on the pragmatism of Sharif and Peretz, courts should 
recognize the potential consequences of jurisdiction by consent, 
particularly in criminal cases.265  If litigant consent can override Article 
III structural protections in the federal felony context, in addition to 
waiving the litigant’s personal right, then the structural prong of Article 
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 262.   Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986). 
 263.   See Judicial Selection in the States, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org 
/Judicial_selection_in_the_states [https://perma.cc/72LM-QULY] (last visited Oct. 6, 2018). 
 264.   See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (2012). 
 265.   See generally Hessick, supra note 19. 
2018 CONSENT CANNOT CONTROL 187 
III is a dead letter.266  Accordingly, Peretz remains an outlier by 
embracing a rule where litigants can waive all Article III protections,267 
threatening to wash away all nuance reflected in the balancing of 
interests in Northern Pipeline, Schor, Stern, and even Sharif. 
C. Magistrate Judge Authority over Other Stages of Felony 
Proceedings 
A bedrock principle animating this article is that felony proceedings 
hold special significance beyond other trial court actions.  Unfortunately, 
even this intuitive observation has been challenged based on the majority 
decisions in Sharif and Peretz.268  The Federal Magistrates Act itself 
draws a distinction by providing explicitly for magistrate judges’ conduct 
of misdemeanor and civil trial with the litigant’s consent, implicitly 
withholding authority over felony trials.269  The distinction is not the 
complexity of certain felony matters for the adjudicator, for the legal 
community has (justifiably) expressed almost-universal confidence in the 
competence of Article I judges.  Rather, certain felony matters “are 
weighted with importance,”270 and those matters require an adjudicator 
with the constitutional protections and stature reserved for Article III 
judges.  Several circuit courts have followed the lead of Peretz and read 
the Additional Duties Clause to include other significant felony 
matters—such as acceptance of guilty pleas—but only with litigants’ 
consent.271  Although only a minority, two courts of appeals have woven 
together instructive decisions regarding statutory grants of authority and 
structural protections and recognized limits on the power of litigant 
consent. 
In Brown v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit delved into the nature 
of collateral attacks on federal criminal convictions and determined that 
“a § 2255 proceeding is not a ‘civil matter’ for purposes of § 636(c).”272  
Brown concluded that Congress did not intend § 636(c) to empower 
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magistrate judges to enter final judgments on § 2255 motions because it 
would entrust final review of a district judge’s trial supervision to a 
magistrate judge.273  Thus, Brown necessarily concluded that a district 
judge must preside over a felony trial.  Brown also noted that magistrate 
judge jurisdiction may not be conferred by litigants’ consent where there 
is a structural Article III concern, consistent with Schor and Stern but not 
Peretz.274 
The Seventh Circuit expressed similar concerns in United States v. 
Harden.  Local Rule 72.1(b) of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Illinois provided that “[w]ith the consent of the 
parties, a magistrate judge is authorized to: (1) conduct voir dire and 
select petit juries for the District Court; (2) accept guilty pleas in felony 
cases, order presentence investigation reports, and file reports and 
recommendations with the District Court.”275  The court determined that 
magistrate judges could not accept guilty pleas—only file reports and 
recommendations for district judges’ review—because “[t]he task of 
accepting a guilty plea is a task too important to be considered a mere 
‘additional duty’” under § 636.276  The Harden decision focused on the 
statutory question (and did not need to reach the Article III issue, as it 
found felony guilty pleas outside the Additional Duties Clause), but the 
court observed the now-familiar rule that consent alone cannot be 
dispositive.277  Finally, Harden explained the break with other circuits—
which have held, based on the usual efficiency concerns, that magistrate 
judges may accept guilty pleas278—by returning to the fundamental 
significance of felony conviction: “A felony guilty plea is equal in 
importance to a felony trial leading to a verdict of guilty.”279 
Notably, Brown and Harden predate Sharif, with its emphasis on 
litigants’ consent.  Still, Sharif involved only state-law civil claims, so 
the concerns in Brown and Harden regarding significant stages of felony 
trial proceedings remain valid.  These appellate decisions focused on the 
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significance of a task, rather than its technical complexity for an 
adjudicator, preserving limits on the delegation of felony duties to 
magistrate judges. 
The contrary position—that the supervision of magistrate judges by 
district judges alleviates all constitutional concerns and enables 
essentially any delegation—ignores the realistic danger that appointed 
Article I officers will garner an ever-increasing percentage of federal trial 
duties, to the detriment of the life-tenured Article III judges the framers 
intended.  Many simply observe that magistrate judges are 
“indispensable.”  This equanimity, sometimes even eagerness, for greater 
magistrate judge participation may reflect the belief that life tenure for 
federal judges is unimportant (or even be harmful to judicial work 
product).280  In this vein, a number of federal courts of appeals have 
embraced broad magistrate judge authority as a matter of efficiency.281  
But the requirements of life tenure and salary protection enshrined in 
Article III by the Framers retain value in our constitutional system, as 
even trial judges are subjected to populist pressure in the digital age.282 
Empirical data reflects a longstanding trend toward increased 
magistrate judge usage without a corresponding increase in district 
judgeships.  The notion that delegations by district judges to magistrate 
judges are purely voluntary (and that litigant consent is similarly 
voluntary) overlooks the lack of new Article III judgeships, forcing 
district judges to share more and more of their caseloads.283  From 1990 
to 2014 the number of pretrial and “additional” felony matters referred to 
magistrate judges annually increased over 400 percent, from 35,576 per 
year to 182,230 per year.284  Peretz paved the way for the ever-increasing 
workload of magistrate judges, of which criminal matters (when 
including collateral attacks) comprise a greater portion than even civil 
matters or administrative appeals.285  Reevaluation is overdue.  Can 
Congress simply freeze the number of district judgeships—and leave 
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numerous district judgeships vacant—indefinitely, allowing larger and 
larger caseloads to force the federal judicial workload onto the shoulders 
of Article I officers?  If another quarter century passes with a 400 percent 
increase in magistrate judge felony workloads, the federal criminal 
process could be reduced further from “a system of pleas, not a system of 
trials”286 to a system of pleas and trials before Article I officers that, as a 
constitutional matter, belong to the same branch of government that 
defined the offenses.287 
Accordingly, the observation in Sharif that, “Adjudication based on 
litigant consent has been a consistent feature of the federal court system 
since its inception,”288 does not address the larger concerns at issue.  
Congress almost certainly did not intend to allow delegation of all 
judicial tasks to magistrate judges, which would render the statutory 
listing of duties entirely superfluous.289  And if that were Congress’s 
intent, the law would represent the kind of encroachment on judicial 
independence that offends separation of powers.290  Finally, as the 
Supreme Court has noted the importance of voir dire to trial291 and 
observed that it is not particularly burdensome for courts to supervise,292 
it is difficult to understand why it is necessary for district judges to 
delegate that task when, in any event, a district judge must supervise the 
trial itself.  Even when compared with rulings after the presentation of 
evidence begins, felony voir dire arguably constitutes the most critical 
moment in any Article III case, for it implicates (1) the rights of the 
accused, (2) each prospective juror’s right to trial participation free of 
racial or gender prejudice, and (3) the integrity of the chosen petit jurors. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
One of the ambiguities created by the expansive reading of 
§ 636(b)(3) in Peretz—specifically, whether the defendant must 
personally consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction over felony voir 
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dire—reached the Supreme Court in Gonzalez v. United States.293  The 
Court held that defense counsel’s consent sufficed and accepted the 
holding in Peretz without reexamining its validity.294 
As the lone dissenter, Justice Thomas would have taken a broader 
view and revisited Peretz itself.  He would have held “that the delegation 
of voir dire in this [felony] case was statutory error.”295  Reprising some 
points raised by Justice Marshall in his Peretz dissent, Justice Thomas 
argued that Gomez offered a more persuasive reading of the Additional 
Duties Clause than the Peretz majority’s “revisionist construction.”296  
Justice Thomas also noted that the Gonzalez case arose due to the 
distortion of the Additional Duties Clause beyond Congress’s intent, for 
Congress would otherwise have indicated whether a defendant’s written 
consent—as opposed to counsel’s consent, or some other form—was 
necessary if magistrate judge authority over felony voir dire had been 
intended.297  He also observed that, under Nguyen, judicial acts that were 
completely beyond statutory authority were subject to review despite the 
lack of a timely objection.298  Justice Thomas also briefly addressed the 
shortcomings of the constitutional analysis in Peretz, noting the term of 
office and removal provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 631 and observing that, 
“[W]hatever their virtues, magistrate judges are no substitute for Article 
III judges in the eyes of the Constitution.”299 
The scenario presented in Peretz and Gonzalez will never provide 
compelling facts: A defendant who consents to participation by a 
qualified magistrate judge is not a sympathetic litigant when complaining 
that, despite crowded dockets, a life-tenured district judge should have 
insisted upon supervising voir dire.  Yet the structural protections of the 
Constitution sometimes demand inefficient results, for the concern is not 
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the fairness of any particular trial;300 it is the fairness of our entire 
system. 
Congress cannot designate felonies and punishments then consign 
adjudications to a system of Article I officers—even with the complicity 
of the federal judiciary itself—whose members do not enjoy the same 
independence as their Article III colleagues.  Congress likely did not 
intend to do so, for felony voir dire is too significant to be termed a mere 
“additional duty” under the Federal Magistrates Act.  The data available 
on civil matters indicates that magistrate judges and district judges are 
not fungible based on outcomes,301 yet magistrate judges garner an ever-
increasing workload in felony matters.302  Statistics and statutes aside, if 
Article III itself imposes some limitation on which officer may preside 
over federal cases,303 it must draw a line at felony trials—and that line 
ought to encompass the significant duty of overseeing felony voir dire. 
The legal community should continue to acknowledge the value of 
Article I judges without encouraging the trend that could eventually 
make life-tenured federal judges a novelty rather than a norm.304  First, 
commentators should recognize Peretz as just one piece of the puzzle—
and a black sheep at that.  Arguments to expand magistrate judge 
jurisdiction to new frontiers, such as felony guilty pleas and collateral 
review, must be cognizant of the countervailing concerns expressed in 
Wingo, Gomez, Schor, Stern, and other cases.  Second, federal courts 
themselves should exercise caution when delegating felony duties and 
reviewing those delegated duties on appeal.305  The demands of 
efficiency should not sweep away the few inviolable Article III duties 
that remain.  Finally, when an opportunity arises, the Supreme Court 
itself should consider whether Peretz remains good law despite its 
deviations from more recent decisions (such as Nguyen and Stern) that 
reflect the persuasive reasoning of pre-Peretz jurisprudence (such as 
Schor and Gomez). 
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With the expanding role of magistrate judges over the last quarter-
century, particularly in felony matters, the narrow majority decision in 
Peretz v. United States remains as dangerous as ever.306  Peretz continues 
to animate legal thought on magistrate judges’ duties despite 
contravening other decisions on statutory construction, constitutional 
limitations, and the importance of certain court proceedings derived from 
the inherent dignity of litigants and criminal adjudication.307  Any 
application of Peretz should, at a minimum, be tempered by careful 
review of other precedent. 
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